Persian Gulf States In Danger Of Terrorist Overspill

Originally at: http://www.forbes.com/business/2005/02/08/cz_0208oxan_gulfstates.html

Recent patterns in terrorist activity in Kuwait suggest that hitherto scattered Kuwaiti extremists are being integrated into a broader national and regional terrorist network.

Before last month, terrorist activity in Kuwait bore all the signs of being the work of isolated cells. These were inspired to undertake violent acts by militant exhortations and coverage of the Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but lacked the ability to make contact with the broader al Qaeda network or each other.

Without the ability to form new networks or plug into the existing Saudi-based network of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Kuwaiti cells were unable to achieve the "articulation" of terrorist functions (e.g., specialist cells undertaking financing, bomb-making, planning and attacks) that allow advanced terrorist capabilities to develop.

Instead, terrorist attacks in Kuwait have been haphazard and small-scale, demonstrating the intent to harm Westerners, but lacking the capability or the explosives to do large-scale damage. The arrest of two Kuwaiti officers in December on charges of conspiring to kill U.S. soldiers is a recent example.

Last month's spate of raids and arrests point to the emergence of a qualitatively different kind of threat, involving the first evidence of an articulated cell structure within Kuwait, linked to terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The Kuwaiti Security Service undertook raids against a group known as the "Peninsula Lions" during which they discovered two explosives caches, the first containing raw materials (hundreds of hand grenades, probably detritus from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait) and the second a bomb-making workshop with nine completed devices packed into bags and ready for delivery. The most recent raids resulted in intense fire fights in Kuwait City suburbs that left six militants, one policeman, and one Bahraini bystander dead. The linked raids appear to have killed the remaining two senior figures in the organization and yielded captives capable of revealing new intelligence.

While the dismantling of the cells reflects well on the capabilities of the KSS, the incidents suggest that home-grown Kuwaiti terrorists are being integrated into the broader Salafist effort throughout the Gulf. The raids took place against a broader backdrop of Kuwaiti jihadist activity in Iraq. Eleven Kuwaitis have been killed while fighting coalition forces and another fifty are estimated to be fighting in Iraq. The Kuwaiti government is holding 22 suspects accused of coordinating the movement of Kuwaiti youths to Iraq via Syria, including a number of those captured during the January raids.

Though few of the Kuwaiti jihadists in Iraq are likely to survive and return without being identified, even a trickle of returning jihadists would increase the likelihood that highly-capable and articulated cells will be established in Kuwait. Even without Kuwaiti returnees from Iraq, recent evidence suggests that Saudi terrorists have aided the recent establishment of articulated cells in Kuwait. Last month's raid on a terrorist hideout in Umm al-Haiman took place close to the Saudi border and resulted in the death of a Saudi national who was working with the cell. Kuwaiti officials have confirmed that:

- the January raids targeted a terrorist group that belongs to the al Qaeda network;
- it is connected with Saudi groups, helped by borders that are open and difficult to control; and
- information provided by Saudi Arabia helped foil further planned operations against Kuwaiti targets.

However, in contrast to its security successes, the government has been slow to address growing Islamist influence and the root causes of militant Islamism in the country.

The rise of radical Salafist sentiment in Kuwait has been caused by a combination of factors, including:

- the country's close association with the United States and provision of military basing at a time when anti-U.S. sentiment is rising across the Islamic world;
- Kuwait's internal struggle between traditionalism and modernism; and
- the sectarian concerns of the Sunni community, principally over the implications of mooted reforms.

These factors are present to some degree or other in most Gulf States, suggesting the possibility that overspill from conflicts in Saudi Arabia and Iraq may affect the other Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Bahrain: The same tensions involving anti-U.S. feelings and disgruntled Sunni Arabs and other traditionalists are present in Bahrain. The Security and Intelligence Service disrupted a terrorist cell comprising known Bahraini Salafists in July, accusing them of planning to bomb government, economic and tourist facilities. The suspects received their religious training in Saudi Arabia or had previously fought in Afghanistan or other jihadist causes. Due to its concentration of expatriate targets, Bahrain will be attractive to terrorists, but, like Kuwait, its small size and effective security services make it a difficult environment in which to establish an articulated cell structure.

Qatar: The government has maintained close ties to Salafist extremists since it sheltered radical Wahhabi clerics exiled from Saudi Arabia after the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979. These elements are now embedded within the country's religious hierarchy and Interior Ministry, and Qatar is a known haven for exiled Islamist terrorists and insurgents. The hard-line Salafist character of Qatar's security establishment is one of the factors that has probably restrained terrorist operations within the emirate. However, if splits were to emerge over the pace of reform, Qatar could be faced with the same scenario as Saudi Arabia: a security apparatus that is slow or unwilling to deal with the threat from Sunni radicals in its midst, making it vulnerable to further overspill from the conflict in Saudi Arabia.

United Arab Emirates: The UAE has functioned as a logistical and planning hub for terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda maritime specialist Abd al-Rahman al-Nashiri ordered the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000 from Dubai and was extradited to the United States while planning further attacks on U.S. interests in the Gulf, possibly within the UAE, which is the world's most regularly visited shore-leave location for U.S. sailors. Al Qaeda has also used the UAE for money-laundering and fund raising, including for the September 11, 2001, attacks. Terrorist actors may be unwilling to disrupt their logistical use of the UAE by carrying out attacks there, but local security services are relatively inexperienced at detecting and disrupting cell activity, and it would only take a single incident to cause a considerable loss of confidence in the UAE.

Oman: The sultanate's only known role in regional terror networks is as a transport node, demonstrated by the March 2002 capture of Canadian Mohammed Jabarah, a suspected Jemaah Islamiah terrorist engaged in planning attacks outside the Gulf. Recent rumours concerning terrorist arrests in Oman have mischaracterised detentions of dissenting intellectuals.

In conclusion, Kuwait and Bahrain are the most likely venues for near-term spill-over from terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia. In the longer term, Qatar may present terrorists with an attractive operating environment. Exposed expatriate communities in the other smaller Gulf States could witness their first attacks if regional terrorists choose to target these countries rather than use them as logistical hubs.